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Abstract:
This paper explores whether membership in ethnically based groups
influences conduct and performance in a spatially dispersed industry. We
test two propositions. First, when group members own several units in a
given market, prices and revenues might be similar to when just one
person owned these units. Second, if group membership provides such
performance benefits, members may locate their units to obtain these
benefits. Using over a thousand hotels located in rural Texas, we test the
role of ethnic group membership by examining hotels owned by
individuals with the surname “Patel”. This surname is common in the
hotel industry, with some estimates of Patels owning one in four US
motels. Though most are not directly related, much anecdotal evidence
suggests that Patels try to lessen the competition among their units.
Interestingly, we find that for Patel owned hotels, proximity of other
Patels confers no performance gains. While collocating at a regional level,
Patels do not collocate at the finer zip code level, which prevents them
from coordinating to enhance performance.
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1ETHNIC LINKS, LOCATION CHOICE AND PERFORMANCE:
A TEST OF THE RURAL MOTEL INDUSTRY
1. Introduction
Firms that own multiple units within a market or that repeatedly contact other
firms across multiple markets may coordinate prices in such a way as to enjoy
performance higher than if the firms were active competitors. Typically, such
coordination requires the multiple units to be owned by the same firm. Yet, recent
research suggests that informal relationships can also sometimes influence firms’
performance. For example, Ingram and Roberts (2000) show that luxury hotels in Sydney
Australia experience greater revenues per room when their top managers are friends –
when they admire each other and have repeated informal exchanges. Beyond formal links
via common ownership, Ingram and Roberts demonstrate that informal relationships
provide the basis for firms to achieve performance differences.
We extend this inquiry of the importance of informal relationships within an
ethnic business network. Past studies on networks of expatriate Chinese entrepreneurs
have concluded that trust (Wong, 1988) and organization flexibility resulting from
network membership (Redding, 1996) have yielded superior performance outcomes for
network members. In this study, we examine whether informal links via ethnic group
membership among multiple collocated firms cause conduct and performance outcomes
similar to those of a single firm that enjoys market power.  Group membership and
informal relationships provide channels for members to coordinate their actions and
mechanisms to discipline members who deviate from the coordinated activity. Group
membership provides informal governance – the more important the group membership,
the stronger the governance. Two propositions emerge. First, when several firms in a
given market are owned by group members, we expect pricing and performance to be
similar to a market where all those firms are owned by the same owner. Second, if group
membership confers performance benefits, we expect members of the group to locate
their firms in configurations to obtain and increase these benefits.
Our empirical setting is the rural Texas hotel industry for the period 1991 through
1998. In this context, we study one specific ethnically based group: hotel owners with the
2surname “Patel”. We focus on Patels since they currently play an important role in this
industry – as a group they own a significant percent of non-luxury hotels in the US. Asian
Indian Americans own over 30% of the American hotel-motel business, according to
Mike Patel, chairman of the Asian American Hotel Owners Association. 1 And among
Asian Indian America hoteliers, “Patel” is the most common surname. A main reason
why the Patels have come to play a key role in the hotel industry is their sheer numbers;
the name is very common in the Gujarat state of India where most Asian American hotel
owners emigrate from, more so than Smith or Jones in the United States.
Given the name’s commonness, the likelihood that two Patels in disparate
locations are directly related is low. Consistent with this, sources often include quotes
like: “It gets so confusing,” states Pushpa Patel, owner of a Howard Johnson’s in
Paramus, NJ. “Guests are constantly saying to me, ‘We stayed at a hotel and the manager
was so-and-so Patel. Is he your cousin or your brother?’”2 While not originating from the
same nuclear family across states, anecdotal evidence suggests that Patels typically
collaborate with each other in the management of their hotels. Other anecdotes suggest
that those Patels in close proximity often are direct relations, which would enhance
informal governance beyond just ethnic group membership.
Overall, while expecting Patel owned units to experience enhanced financial
performance when surrounded by other units also owned by Patels and therefore for
Patels to collocate; we find that proximity of other Patels confers no performance benefit.
Further investigating the lack of performance we find that while Patels locate regionally
proximate to one another, they do not locate in close proximity; they locate in the same
regions, but not the same zip codes. Likely the lack of close proximity permits non-Patel
owned hotels to locate intermediately, which reduces the Patels’ ability to coordinate
among themselves and thus achieve enhanced financial performance.
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we present information about the
phenomenon of Patel-owned hotels, both from other sources and from our data set. We
describe the nature of the ties within the community of Patels, as well as some
explanations for the evolution of the dominance of Patels in the hotel industry. Second,
                                                
1 “Indians Find Niche in Hotel Industy,” New Orleans Times-Picayne, September 24, 1998, p. 4A1.
2 Ibid, p. B1.
3we present simple hypotheses regarding the pricing decisions and revenue performance
of the Patel hotels. Third, we present hypotheses regarding the location of the Patels and
present results of a full-information nested logit model. The fourth section concludes.
2. Patel Hotels
Patels are Asian Indian Americans, coming mostly from the western coastal state
of Gujarat in India. They represent a surprisingly high percent of owners among non-
luxury hotels and motels in the United States. The Asian American Hotel Owners
Association reports that “nearly all of the trade group’s 4,000 members are named
Patel.”3 Consistent with pervasiveness of Patel owned hotels, our data for the rural Texas
hotel industry shows that 59 of 741 hotels (8.0%) first opened after 1990, were opened as
sole proprietorships by Patels or by corporations where one owner is a Patel. We define
as rural the units that lie outside the six largest counties in Texas, those that contain
Dallas, Fort Worth, Houston, San Antonio, Austin, and El Paso. At the end of 1998, 310
of 2057 rural Texas hotels/motels (15.1%) with 15 rooms or more were operated as sole
proprietorships by Patels or by corporations where at least one owner is a Patel.
India Abroad, a publication for Indian expatriates, believes the first Patel to go
into the hotel business was Nagiihhai Patel, who bought his first motel in Sacramento in
1933.4 From there, Millman (1997) chronicles the rise of the Patel owned hotels. When
India was a British colony, Patels wound up in England or in African colonies such as
Malawi, Zambia and Uganda. Many Patels were expelled from Uganda during the brutal
reign of dictator Idi Amin in the 1970s, who also confiscated their businesses. Fleeing
with limited savings, these Indian expatriates searched for suitable destinations.
These Indian expatriates and subsequent Indian immigrants found non-luxury
hotels in the US an attractive business opportunity for several reasons. First, entry
barriers are low. With an investment of $40,000, the displaced could secure immigrant
status in the United States. The question became “What to invest in?” With a $40,000
investment, choice was limited to small establishments such as diners or roadside motels.
Versus other choices, rural hotels provide both a business opportunity and a place of
residence. Brothers C.Z. and D.Z. Patel own the Villa Inn, a 1960s-vintage 40-room
                                                
3 “What’s in a Surname? A passel of Patels: Indian Moniker is Big in Motel Biz,” The Record – Northern
New Jersey, August 10, 1995, p. B1.
4motel. “It's like a home business,” said D.Z. Patel, 45, who was a mechanical engineer in
India before he came to the United States 10 years ago. “You live on the premises and
save money.” D.Z. Patel moved to Colorado City with his wife and two children in 1997.
They live at the Villa Inn with his brother's family. The only non-family member who
works at the motel is a part-time housekeeper. 5 Choosing to operate a hotel provides
Asian Indian immigrants both a livelihood and lodging. Finally, their East Indian cultural
background limits their choices. Operating restaurants was not palatable since as Hindus,
they were uncomfortable handling meat. And being foreigners, they found difficult the
face-to-face interactions restaurant work requires, such as seating the customer, taking
the order, serving, revisiting the customer, bringing a check and bringing change.
Therefore, the Patels developed the Indian motel plan, renting rooms for $25 to $50 a
night, with minimal customer interaction. The plan was once half-jokingly described as:
“Here is your room. Here is your key. Goodbye.”
Contagion further increased the size of the Patel hotel community. Much like the
format adoption of radio stations described in Greve (1995), the Patels’ likelihood of
choosing to operate a hotel in the low-price market niche was higher than other potential
owners due to contagion, in this case based on their ethnic background. Millman reports
that the well-maintained but no-frills “Patel motel” not only created a new market, but
was so successful that it forced full-service hotel chains such as Marriott to respond with
“economy” lodgings.
Not initially having the resources to afford more expensive hotels, Patel-owned
hotels often lie in rural areas and along highways. For example in Texas, Pankaj Patel,
Mahesh Patel, Hasmukh Patel and Pravin Patel own motels in the Midland-Odessa area.
At least four Patels own motels in Lubbock. Both of these towns are over 300 miles from
any large Texan city. Other articles in the popular press confirm similar trends across the
United States.
Once in the US, initial immigrants attracted a profusion of followers through
family and friendship ties, enabling the contagion to take place. One sibling would help
find a suitable hotel for their siblings and other relations. One article from Oregon
                                                                                                                                                
4 India abroad, Summer, 1989.
5describes how one family’s location choice planted the seed for an entire community.
Nick Patel, the article states, and several dozen other Patels have carved a niche in the
metro Portland area's economy lodging industry. 6 The article discusses how Nick’s move
to Portland in 1978 made the area more attractive for other Hindu immigrants. Nick
became a leader of the local Hindu community, almost all of whom are innkeepers. These
familial ties increase the likelihood of a new arrival’s success by providing managerial
knowledge, emotional support, and financial assistance.
However, such assistance was not limited to just nuclear families. “Whenever one
of our countrymen runs into trouble, we are always there to help him out,” says Deepak
Bhayani, a 49-year-old Indian-born franchisee with Dunkin' Donuts shops in two Illinois.
When Mr. Bhayani was unable to work for two months because of heart-bypass surgery,
he says other immigrant franchisees stepped in to supervise his stores – including Amrit
Patel. “They are my friends,” Mr. Patel says. “When friends need help, I always go for
it.”7 Such behavior is consistent with Granovetter’s (1995) argument that informal links
can provide advantage when entities are simultaneously “coupled” and “decoupled”.
Entities upon whom reciprocal claims can be made are coupled to each other, but being
coupled to many others can be detrimental – too many potential claims can lead to claims
going unanswered. Immigrant business owners as minorities are coupled to each other
through their ethnicity but are also simultaneously decoupled ethnically from the majority
(they are also geographically decoupled from others of their same ethnicity in their home
country).
“In India, everybody thinks like a family,” Bob Patel, owner of a Red Carpet Inn
in North Carolina, said. “We try to help each other.” People from India looking to own a
business might logically choose the lodging industry, he said, because so many of their
friends own hotels and motels. Established innkeepers can advise and support
newcomers. Further, these immigrant communities maintain close and regular contact.
For example, fifty Hindu families meet weekly for religious observances in the Portland
area. Bob Patel states further “The Indian immigrants will share information with each
                                                                                                                                                
5 All quotes from this paragraph taken from “Where the East meets West. Texas Indian immigrants' 'Patel
motels' thrive,” The Dallas Morning News, April 25, 1999
6 All quotes in this paragraph taken from “Immigrants Find Sweet Success in Lodgings,” Portland
Oregonian, April 22, 1999.
6other about which banks offer the lowest rates on mortgages. They'll spread among
themselves the names of customers who have stiffed them on a room bill. To save
money, they’ll join forces to buy televisions and other motel equipment in bulk. When
times are tight, they’ll loan each other money.”
The proliferation of hotels owned by East Indians might heighten competition
among them, especially if they are proximately located. The location of Patels
proximately to one another is a likely outcome since existing immigrant hoteliers often
assist subsequent entrants by identifying suitable properties. Such a search for suitable
properties is likely bounded by distance – an existing hotelier can ill afford to travel far
from their own hotel. This heightened competition might outweigh the benefits that
accrue through family and ethnic ties. Aldrich and Waldinger (1990) argue that while
offering benefits, ethnic groups are also their own most likely competition. For example,
when asked why he was forced to go back to accepting business from prostitutes, Dallas
motel-owner Chandrakant Patel said, “After awhile, you say, ‘I can't survive, I've got to
go back to hourly rates.’ Competition among the various Patels is the biggest problem we
have.”8
While some note the heightened competition, surprisingly, many Indian hoteliers
say they don't mind the added competition. The benefits of numbers apparently outweigh
the costs. Suresh Gupta, an Indian hotelier who owns a Holiday Inn near Orlando, states
that he would help any Indian asking for advice on a hotel location. Gupta claims he
would even loan such a person the money to start, even if that person would end up a
competitor.9 The Indian hotel and motel owners are banding together to achieve
monopsony power when buying supplies or insurance, which may outweigh the problems
of competition. “If you’re one person, who cares… they’ll drop you like that,” said Tulsi
Dhanani, who has been in the lodging business since 1983. “But if you have a crowd of
ten, you have power. When you're a group, you have strength.”10
                                                                                                                                                
7 Quotes taken from “Spreading the Dough Around,” The Wall Street Journal, February 22, 1999.
8 “Indian Entrepreneurs: Immigrant Patels cashing in on Dallas' sexually oriented motels,” The Dallas
Morning News, June 14, 1987.
9 “Hands Across the Water: Close-knit Indian Community Strong Force in Economy Hotels,” Orlando
Business Journal, June 12, 1998, p. 23.
10 “Passage From India Immigrants Work Together To Make A Mark In N.O. Area,” The New Orleans
Times-Picayune, July 28, 1992.
7The initial displacement of Indian expatriates combined with the presence of
managerial knowledge, emotional support, and financial assistance accruing through
ethnic ties helps explains how the Patel hotel phenomenon grew to its present
proportions. Further, the ethnic ties mean that Patel hoteliers need to choose locations
trading off heightened competition versus managerial, emotional, and financial
assistance. Both result from proximity. Baum and Haveman (1997) emphasize such
trade-offs of losses and gains from proximity, which provides many dilemmas for hotel
owners in general. They find that new hotels establish themselves at similar prices but of
different sizes to those around them in order to reduce the competition but gain from
lucrative locations. The Patels have an even more complex set of issues due to proximity
than most due to their ethnic ties.
Given the prominence of such a social, ethnic group in the rural hotel industry, we
develop propositions as to how group membership affects financial performance and
location choice.
3. Pricing Conduct and Revenue Performance
3.1 Theory and Hypotheses
Given the prevalence of Patels in Texas and the ethnic links influencing their
location patterns, proximity among Patel owned units is inevitable. We ask how this
proximity affects the performance of Patel operated hotels.
Industrial economists such as Levy and Reitzes (1992) and Werden and Froeb
(1994) have studied the effects on price of mergers in a spatial setting. Their theoretical
work shows that ownership of multiple nearby outlets allows an owner to charge higher
prices relative to what would be charged with the same configuration of outlets under
separate ownership due to the spatial market power they enjoy. Consistent with such
hypotheses, Conlin (1999) presents evidence that hotel room prices are higher when the
same owners own multiple units in a city. Even if spatially dispersed outlets are owned
by different owners, they may collude on price under certain conditions, yielding price
and performance outcomes similar to those of the spatial market power case. In the
standard game theoretic arguments (e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991) and specifically in
a geographic multimarket context (Bernheim and Whinston, 1990), firms can maintain a
8collusive agreement if each firm can construct a punishment for the other that outweighs
the benefit of reneging on the agreement.
Williamson (1993, 1996) emphasizes the role of such calculative behavior in the
trust that allows firms to maintain collusive agreements. While the punishments available
to firms are typically restricted to lowering price in future periods, economists have
pointed out that loss of reputation within a group can also serve as a type of punishment
that would prevent an individual from reneging on an agreement (e.g., Ellickson, 1989).
Sociologists have argued that the mechanism through which agreements are more likely
to be respected when a party is part of a group may not be a calculated response to a
threat of punishment. Uzzi (1996) discusses a heuristic character of trust that appears
inconsistent with rational calculation, yet facilitates the exchange of assets that benefit
both parties. Regardless of which of these approaches is preferable to the reader, both
suggest that members of a group are more likely to cooperate than those who share no
group membership.
In our empirical context, Patels who belong to the same social and ethnic group
may have such punishments available – they may not be allowed to participate when
other Patels group purchase from suppliers or they might be made to feel unwelcome at
community gatherings. Given such potential penalties, we expect Patels who operated
hotels that are proximate to each other will be able to coordinate their pricing policies.
Assuming the Patels jointly optimize prices along with occupancy, then they would also
experience increased revenues. More formally, we propose:
Hypothesis 1: If agglomeration by Patels is likely due to maintenance of pricing
agreements, Patels should be able to charge higher prices than their equivalent
non-Patel competition.
Hypothesis 2: If agglomeration by Patels is likely due to maintenance of pricing
agreements, Patels should enjoy higher revenues than their equivalent non-Patel
competition.
3.2 Data
Our data were provided to us by the Texas State government and includes all
establishments operating as hotels or motels in Texas for the quarters between the years
of 1991 and 1998 inclusive. The data provides a hotel’s name, opening date, street
9address, owner name, owner location, size in rooms, and revenues. In the original data,
often hotel owners are listed as corporations and Patels might own some of these
corporations. Therefore, to identify Patel-owned corporations, we used the Texas State
incorporation-listing file and compared the list of all corporations owned by Patels with
the corporations that owned hotels. Any hotel that has an owner with or that is
incorporated and has a partner with the surname “Patel” we identify as a Patel owned
hotel.
While primarily hotels and motels, this data also includes many bed and
breakfasts, rental rooms in private residences, and time-share condos. We purposefully
want to exclude such occurrences, which do not operate in the same segment as hotels
and motels; bed & breakfasts are often destinations themselves, while hotels and motels
are temporary housing on the way to or proximate to travelers’ end destinations. To
remove such observations, we examine an establishment’s reported number of rooms and
remove the observation if the number of rooms is below fifteen. After applying the
greater than fifteen rooms cutoff, on average 1,600 establishments remain in each quarter
of data.
We use zip codes to define market locations, which is the finest level of
geographic gradation available in our data. In rural Texas, typically a zip code only
contains one if any freeway exits. Since the likelihood of a hotel being in a zip code but
not at a freeway exit is small, we say hotels are agglomerated when they are in the same
zip code. Therefore, any hotels in the same zip code, we assume to be agglomerated – or
collocated around the freeway exit.
From the original Texas government data, we obtain one dependent variable:
revenues per room, which is an industry standard measure of performance. Revenues can
increase through greater occupancy, higher prices, or a combination of both. All these
possibilities increase revenues. Instead of just total revenues, we scale a hotel’s revenues
by its number of rooms since we are interested in an establishment’s performance relative
to its size. Large hotels are clearly going to have higher revenues than smaller hotels; we
ask if a hotel performs better than other hotels, given its size.
To obtain our second dependent variable, room prices, we conducted a phone
survey. Between May 15 and May 20, 1999, we conducted a price survey of all rural
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hotels with current telephone listings in the Yellow Pages. We were able to contact 1097
active telephone listings and asked these hotels for their price including tax for one room
for one person on weekdays and weekends.11 The results presented below are based on
the weekday prices, which in most cases, do not vary from the weekend prices. Of these
1097 hotels, Patels owned 171.
Given our price data is only for early 1999, we use revenue per room data from
the Texas government for the closest comparable period available, the 4th quarter of 1998.
To explain differences in revenue per room and prices, our variables of theoretical
interest are: (1) a dummy variable indicating whether a given hotel is owned by a Patel,
(2) the percentage of hotel rooms in a zip code owned by Patels, not counting the current
hotel, and (3) an interaction term of these two variables.12
Other variables are included as controls. These include hotel-specific measures
such as size in rooms of the hotel, an incorporation dummy, the number of stars that
AAA has assigned to the hotel, and multimarket contact at an owner and chain level. The
multimarket measures are the typical count measures of total markets of overlap (Evans
and Kessides, 1994; Gimeno, 1999); as mentioned above, we define a market at the zip
code level. The other variables are zip code level controls including population, average
income, aggregate number of hotel rooms, whether an interstate runs through the zip
code, and a Herfindahl index of concentration. This index can be written as Sk (share)2
where share the percentage of rooms in zip code owned by owner k. This variable ranges
from zero to one, with zero indicating the case of perfect competition and one indicating
a monopoly. These measures are constructed from the Texas State data or obtained from
the 1990 US Census of Population.
3.3 Method and Results
We test the financial performance hypotheses using a two-dimensional fixed-
effects ordinary least squares model, with price and revenues per room as the dependent
variables. Fixed effects are included for each chain and each county. Prices and revenues
certainly vary by chain and by location. Holiday Inns will on average earn more than Red
                                                
11 Use of prices in the AAA guides was not useful because under 20% of hotels in our sample were listed in
AAA.
12 All tests were also conducted changing the percentage of hotel rooms in a zip code owned by Patels to a
case including the current hotel.  None of the results changed in any way.
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Roof Inns. Similarly, some hotels might be located in counties home to important rural
attractions like the state fairgrounds. To prevent such variation from being attributed to
our variables of interest, we include the fixed effects. Thus, the coefficients of all our
other variables reflect within-chain and within-county variation. Independent hotels are
lumped together as the base case. Note a hotel might both be chain affiliated and operated
by a Patel; in such a case both the particular chain dummy variable and the Patel dummy
variable would be coded as “1”. 13
The price and revenue per room regressions both contain the same sets of
independent variables. The interaction term between (1) the dummy variable indicating
whether a given hotel is owned by a Patel and (2) the percentage of hotel rooms in a zip
code owned by Patels should have a positive effect on prices and revenues if Hypotheses
1 and 2 are corroborated. The interaction term indicates that a given Patel can charge
higher prices because a high percentage of other rooms are owned by Patels, giving them
the ability to collude on price.
 [ Table 1 about here ]
As Table 1 shows, all the Patel-related variables are all not significantly different
from zero. Both the main effects and the interaction between the main effects are
insignificant. Patels do not charge higher prices than anyone does in high-Patel areas, nor
do they enjoy higher revenues per room.
While the variables of theoretical interest are non-significant, several controls are
significantly different from zero. The controls for hotel traits are signed as expected.
Owner level multimarket contact is significantly positive, which suggests that multi-unit
owners who encounter each other repeatedly across markets can price higher and thus
enjoy higher revenues. Whether a hotel is incorporated significantly increase both
measures of financial performance, which likely indicates the relative quality of the hotel
– owners of higher quality hotels incorporate. Larger hotels (as measured by room size)
charge more; larger hotels have more features that allow them to price higher. And higher
                                                
13 Chains in the hotel industry are often franchised. As a result, they are often made up of many small local
owners such as the Patels. See Chung and Kalnins (2000) for more details of ownership structures within
chains.
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quality hotels, as indicated by AAA star ratings, also charge more and earn higher
revenues per room.
Most control variables for market conditions within the zip code are also signed
as expected. While population and average income are related, together they suggest that
hotels set higher prices in wealthier zip codes. Surprisingly, the presence of an interstate
in the zip code has negative effects, likely resulting from higher competition in these
areas. Presence of an interstate in a zip code needs to be considered together with hotels
in a zip code since an interstate will increase demand by providing a conduit for travelers,
but such a conduit will then attract more competitors.14 The significance of the
Herfindahl index indicates that owners raise price when they own more units, confirming
the results of Conlin (1999). We note however, that the high concentration as measured
by the Herfindahl has no revenue performance benefit.
Given that most control variables conform to expectations, the lack of effect for
the three Patel variables is curious. Given that we expect Patels to informally coordinate
over prices, such coordination requires physical proximity. Therefore, to better
understand the non-significant results, we investigate further and examine location
choice.
4. The choice of location of new hotels
4.1 Theory and Hypotheses
As a starting point, we ask “are Patels likely to agglomerate in their location
choices in particular areas?” All anecdotes suggest that they will. However, an interesting
subsequent question is “what is the reason for the agglomeration?” Is agglomeration
merely to be close to other Patels for social and religious purposes? Or is it to be close
enough so that information is meaningful and can be effectively exchanged? Finally, is it
to be close enough to coordinate pricing decisions for market power purposes? Not
surprisingly since such behavior is illegal, none of the Patels quoted in the popular press
                                                
14 While initially expecting a negative sign for hotels in zip code and a positive sign for interstate in zip
code, the positive sign for hotels in zip code suggests heighten demand results when hotels agglomerate.
When multiple hotels are present in one location, this offers travelers greater breadth and depth of
selection; this increased selection would increase visitation by travelers, which increases demand and thus
the price that hotels could charge. The coefficient estimates suggest that this potential agglomeration gain
though heightened demand occurs in zip codes where interstates pass through that have more than 8.4
hotels (8.4 * 0.854 > -7.193).
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mention pricing agreements as a way in which the Patels could help each other. While not
mentioned, such behavior is possible. These questions suggest that we examine location
behavior to see how closely Patels physically locate to each other.
If maintaining market power is the primary reason for agglomerating, this would
require closer proximity because the hotels would have to be seen as close substitutes by
potential customers. While the Patels might locate their hotels further apart to reduce
supply and thus maintain market power; the low barriers to entry in the hotel industry
likely preclude this possibility – a non-Patel owned hotel might choose an intermediate
location that would reduce the Patel’s likelihood of coordinating on price. More likely is
the possibility that Patels encourage other Patels to locate nearby in order to pre-empt
competition, that is, to make the location less appealing for potential non-Patel
competition. 15
On the other hand, if proximity for community and religious activities, or for
coordinating purchases, is the primary reason for any agglomeration among Patels, as
close proximity as for pricing coordination purposes is not needed. As long as the choice
of a particular location allowed the Patels to meet on weekends for religious observances,
for example, it would be acceptable. Thus, Patels could build hotels reasonably far apart,
even upwards of a hundred miles apart.
Thus, intent should be consistent with the level of agglomeration; agglomeration
at a broad level is consistent with social activities, while agglomeration at a fine level is
consistent with economic activities. Or stated more formally:
Hypothesis 3: If agglomeration by Patels is likely due to maintenance of pricing
agreements or for pre-emption purposes, Patels are likely to agglomerate at a
narrow market level.
Hypothesis 4: If agglomeration by Patels is likely due to maintenance of social
and religious ties, Patels are likely to agglomerate at a broad regional level.
                                                
15 For the basic pre-emption argument, please see Dixit (1980). For the case of pre-emption via multiple
locations in geographic or product space, please see Judd (1985) and Hadfield (1991).
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4.2 The Nested Logit Method
To test these two hypotheses, we model the choice of location for new hotels
using the random utility framework. In this model, we treat zip codes in Texas that
contain hotels as the elemental alternatives for each choice of hotel location. In the
random utility framework, all actors making the choice are assumed to value fundamental
attributes of an alternative (such as number of existing hotels in a zip code) equally. We
expect to observe different choices of location for two reasons. First, the levels of the
attributes for the same alternative are not identical across different actors. For example,
as the different actors make their choice at different times, the number of existing hotels
in a zip code will change. Second, an error term is also included for each choice for each
actor, leading to some variation even if all values of the observable attributes are equal
across all actors.
Some of the primary alternatives (the zip codes) in our choice set are likely to
share unobserved characteristics due to geographical proximity. Therefore, the error
terms of such zip codes are likely to be correlated, and we estimate a nested conditional
logit model. McFadden (1978) proves that the nested logit model is consistent with the
random utility model of choice preference. Use of nested logit models requires the
researcher to choose a nesting structure for the random utility model, that is, to make
assumptions regarding the correlation between alternatives. In our case, all zip codes that
are within driving distance of a location where the Indian community may hold social or
religious events would exhibit a positive unobservable correlation in their probability of
being chosen as a hotel site by a Patel. Thus, we split Texas into 25 regions in the first
level of our nesting structure. The second level choice set consists of three zip codes per
region: the zip code actually chosen and two others that are drawn randomly.16 For the
regional and zip code levels, we introduce sets of independent variables. Choice among
the zip codes tests Hypothesis 3 by assessing the significance of Xij, the zip code level
variables. Choice among these regions tests Hypothesis 4 by assessing the significance of
Zi, the regional level variables. This nested logit technique with multiple levels and
                                                
16 The selection of 25 regions and 3 zip codes within a region is driven by software constraints. The Limdep
7.0 software package limits the user to 75 elemental alternatives.
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choice sampling is a standard technique used commonly among transportation alternative
and brand selection studies in economics and marketing.
In our random utility model, we define an underlying latent variable Vijk to
represent the utility to each new hotel owner k of opening a hotel in zip code j within
Region i. i = 1 to 25 are the 25 regions, each containing Ni zip codes. j = 1 to Ni are the
zip codes within each region i that contain at least one hotel. Then the observed variable
Yijk is such that:
Yijk = 1 if Vijk > Vmnk for m = 1 to 25 and n = 1 to Nm, but n is not equal to j, and
Yijk = 0 otherwise.
In other words, we observe the owner k locating a hotel in zip code j within
region i if the utility of such a choice exceeds all other choices.
The utility for each owner Vijk is given by observable characteristics Zik and Xijk.
Assuming a linear relationship between observables and the latent variable, we can write:
Vijk = b1’Zik + b2’Xijk + eijk, where Zik only varies by region i and the hotel owner
k and the Xijk vary by zip code j as well.
However, due to the errors eijk in the calculation of Vijk the utility becomes
random. Within this random utility framework, the probability of an owner choosing a
particular zip code for a new hotel can be viewed as the product of a marginal and
conditional probability.
The probability of Yijk being 1 is equivalent to the probability of observing a new
hotel opening in that zip code, which occurs when that location offers a higher utility
versus all other options; or P (Yijk = 1) = P(Zip Codeij) = P (Vijk > Vmnk).
P(Zip Codeij) = P(Zip Codeij | Regioni) * P(Regioni), where P(Zip Codeij |
Regioni) is the probability of choosing Zip Codej conditional on the choice
of Regioni.
If the residuals are drawn from an extreme value (Gumbel) distribution, then we
can write:
P(Zip Codeij | Regioni) = exp (b2’Xij) / exp (Ii) where Ii = log(Sj exp (b2’Xij)), and
P(Regioni) = exp (b1’Zi + b3Ii) / Sm exp (b1’Zm + b3Im) where m = 1 to 25.
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These two equations can be estimated simultaneously via full information
maximum likelihood (FIML). While a sequential method would be less data intensive, in
this case the full information method is particularly important because we are trying to
tease apart the relative importance of variables at two levels of agglomeration (the
regional and zip code level). Sequential methods cannot evaluate both levels
simultaneously.
The Ii are called “inclusive values” and are a measure of the sum of the utilities
for all zip codes within a region. The coefficients on the inclusive values, the variables b3,
measure the degree of correlation across error terms of alternatives. This correlation
should be positive for zip codes within the same region since these zip codes’ error terms
should contain common unobservable influences. This positive correlation should exist
for all zip codes in a region and for a random sample of zip codes in a region.
We note that a nested logit is a variation of McFadden’s conditional logit model.
In a conditional logit formulation, the investigator estimates how attributes of the choices
themselves influence their likelihood of being chosen.  In the case of a multinomial logit,
the investigator estimates how attributes of the choosers influence what is chosen. For
example, whether a person drives a BMW, a Volkswagen, or a Ford is both a function of
the drivers’ characteristics and the cars’ characteristics. While the traditional multinomial
logit focuses on the drivers’ characteristics, the conditional logit focuses on the cars’
characteristics.  The conditional logit yields one coefficient per variable regardless of
number of choices, while the multinomial logit yields N-1 coefficients per variable for a
model with N choices.  To continue the car example, a conditional model would yield a
single coefficient for the independent variable “miles per gallon”, while the variable
“consumer’s income” in a multinomial setting would yield one coefficient for its effect
on the choice of a BMW relative to the baseline choice of a Ford, and one for the
Volkswagen, again relative to the choice of a Ford.  For a comprehensive presentation of
the nested logit model the reader is referred to McFadden (1978), Ben-Akiva and Lerman
(1985); and Maddala (1983).
17
4.3 The Data and Results
The dependent variable is where new hotels were built – in which zip code within
which region. Independent variables are characteristics of where these hotels were built
versus where they were not. Using our data from the Texas State Government we include
an observation for all 741 new hotels built in Texas between 1991-1998, including 59
owned by Patels.17
The independent variables of theoretical interest are the counts of existing Patel
hotels in each zip code and region at the time the decision is made by owner k to open the
new hotel. An interaction term is added that equals the count of existing Patel hotels if
the owner choosing the location is a Patel and zero otherwise. We include the choices of
non-Patel hoteliers to determine whether the Patels behavior is any different from that of
the other hotel owners.
The other variables are included as control variables. At the zip code level, we
include population and average income to reflect demand. For the nature of supply, we
include the counts of chain hotels and incorporated non-chain hotels at both the zip code
and regional levels. As Patels are more likely to be non-incorporated than the general
population of hotel owners, the incorporated counts must be included to prevent
significance from being attributed to membership in the Patel group. The inclusion of the
chain variable has similar rationale, because the chain membership is negatively
correlated with Patel ownership.
Results are shown as Table 2 below. Regional level variables are grouped above
zip code level variables.
[ Table 2 about here ]
Before interpreting the coefficient estimates, we need to assessing the suitability
of our nested structure using the coefficients attracted by the “inclusive values” – the
estimate of the sum of the utilities for all zip codes within a region. The coefficients on
the inclusive values measure the degree of correlation across error terms or alternatives
                                                
17 While having some data for hotels founded before 1991, we do not have full information on the
competitive landscape since for those hotels established before 1991, the data set only includes surviving
hotels. We only observe survivors. Therefore, we limit our panel to 1991 and after.
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and therefore should range from zero to one. But a large number of inclusive values
greater than one indicates that the alternatives in different nests are actually more
correlated than those within the given nest, implying that the analyst has not chosen a
valid nesting structure. To determine our nesting structure, we initially group zip codes
into regions based upon contiguity, common access to the same interstate highway, and
proximity to potential regional centers. With our 25 regions, 24 of the inclusive values
are in the range from zero to one. The one remaining is negative, but statistically not
different from zero. Further, in our model, 15 of the values are statistically different from
one at a 5% level or better, implying that the nesting structure is preferable to a simple
single-level choice model at the zip code level. This indicates that our model is correctly
specified; that is, we have chosen an appropriate nesting structure.
In Table 2, looking at the group of regional variables on the top half of the table,
we see that Patels do agglomerate at the regional level, based on the positive and
significant coefficient of the interaction of Patel count for Patels. In other words, Patels
are more likely to choose regions of Texas that have more existing Patel hotels. Turning
to the zip code level variables on the bottom half of the table, we see that this trend does
not persist at this more refined geographic level. The likelihood of Patels locating in zip
codes that already contain Patels does not increased or decreased in a statistically
significant way. Thus, Patels agglomerate at a regional but not a zip code level.
Several control variables attract statistically significant coefficients. The
coefficients for “interaction of chain count for chain” indicate that while not co-locating
on a regional level, chain hotels do co-locate with other chain units at the finer zip-code
level. While suggestive of chains distinctly seeking each other out, these estimates might
also reflect chains being attracted by similar unobserved location traits. Interestingly, the
count of incorporated non-chain variable at the zip code attracts a significant positive
coefficient indicating that hoteliers are more likely to choose zip codes with non-chain
hotels. Hoteliers may see such hotels as weaker competition and be drawn to such
locations.
5. Conclusion
Recent research highlights the importance of informal links for firms’
performance. We extend the inquiry into the importance of informal links by examining
19
whether social and ethnic group membership alters a firm’s financial performance. Group
membership and informal relationships provide possible channels for members to
coordinate their actions and mechanisms to discipline members who deviate from the
coordinated activity. Using the rural hotel industry of Texas, we focus on hotel owners
with the surname of “Patel”. These Patel owned hotels compose 15% of rural hotels in
Texas and anecdotal evidence suggests that Patels have extensive informal contact and
cooperate with each other in the management of their hotels.
We investigated two propositions. First, whether Patel owned hotels experience
enhanced financial performance when surrounded by other units also owned by Patels.
Second, whether Patels tend to collocate their hotels. Our results indicate that the
proximity of other Patels confers no financial performance gains; two-way fixed-effect
regressions show that the prices and revenues per rooms of Patel owned hotels are not
significantly different when other Patels are located close by.
To better understand this non-significant finding for financial performance, we
investigate location choices by Patel owned hotels. The Patel hotels may geographically
locate in such a way that makes colluding on price difficult. Using a nested logit model,
we find that Patels do cluster in broad geographical areas in Texas, but not at a finer
geographic level; they collocate on a regional level, but not at a zip code level. This
provides a likely explanation for why the performance results showed no effect on price
or revenue per room at the zip code level. They locate close enough to obtain social and
cultural benefits, but not close enough for coordination on pricing. Potentially, we never
observe great enough concentration of Patels at a zip code level for them to coordinate
and achieve enhanced financial performance. Indeed, this suggests coordination of
another type – recognizing that price maintenance with each other might be difficult, they
purposefully locate far enough apart not to have to compete on price. Another potential
explanation is that since the Patels fill a low-price niche, even when coordination among
themselves would otherwise be possible, they are unable to charge higher prices.
Because of the lack of significance for Patel owned hotels on price or revenue
performance at a local level, we do not explore whether Patels are able to behave as a
single multimarket owner when dealing with other firms. Without any apparent ability to
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collude on price among themselves, it is very unlikely that they could act as a single
owner in achieving mutual forbearance with competitors.
The non-significant findings for price and revenue performance do not preclude
the importance of informal links. Cooperation of the Patels likely cannot be captured by
price and revenue performance alone. Most of the anecdotal evidence of cooperation
discussed cost-saving activities, not price heightening issues. Cooperation among the
Patels in the sphere of obtaining financing, buying in bulk, or sharing information would
most likely reduce costs and increase the probability of survival. If cost structures of the
hotels were available, this presents a fruitful avenue for future research.
Overall, this study helps define the limits of informal links. Ingram and Roberts
note that one of the main discipline mechanisms among luxury hotels is referrals –
overbooking by luxury hotels is common and when hoteliers are friends they will
reciprocally refer surplus customers to each other. Not being considered for such referrals
is a significant punishment. Such pecuniary punishment may be unavailable among Patel
owned hotels, which decreases the likelihood of coordination. Future research might
distinguish between direct family members and just owners with the same surname.
Versus ethnic group membership, membership in the same nuclear family likely provides
much stronger coordination and discipline mechanisms. Finally, since this study provides
an interesting set of findings and non-findings for members of informal groups, this
suggests further investigation of who agglomerates and how location choice affects
performance for other groups such as chain versus non-chain hotels, single owner versus
multi-unit owner hotels, and in-state versus out-of-state owned hotels.
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Table 1: Determinants of Hotel Financial Performance
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with 2-way fixed effects
Dep. Var. is
Room Price
Dep. Var. is
Revenue/Room
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Patel-owned hotel 0.168 2.005 -0.021 0.111
Pct Patel hotels in zip
code
4.227 4.342 -0.085 0.239
Interaction of Patel-
owned and pct Patel
-2.795 8.274 -0.598 0.456
Multimarket contact,
owner level
0.255** 0.052 0.017** 0.003
Multimarket contact,
chain level
-0.068 0.053 -0.005 0.003
Incorporated hotel 3.771** 1.348 0.377** 0.074
Room count in hotel 0.154** 0.013 0.002* 0.001
AAA stars (if listed) 1.590** 0.572 0.150** 0.032
1990 Zip population -0.276** 0.056 0.002 0.003
1990 Average income 0.330* 0.142 0.011 0.008
Hotels in zip code 0.854** 0.132 0.003 0.007
Interstate in zip code -7.193** 2.072 -0.228* 0.114
Herfindahl index 5.039* 2.093 0.145 0.115
Chain & county dummies Yes** Yes**
R2 0.691 0.648
N 1097 1097
**: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05
24
Table 2: Determinants of Hotel Location Choice
Full information maximum likelihood (FIML) Nested Logit
Dep. Var. is
Choice of Zip Code
Coefficient Std. Error
Regional level variables (b3)
Count of hotels owned by chooser 0.734** 0.118
Count of chain hotels -0.068** 0.021
Count of Patel-owned hotels -0.033 0.050
Count of incorporated non-chain hotels 0.032 0.025
Interaction of chain count for chain 0.008 0.015
Interaction of Patel count for Patels 0.174* 0.073
Zip code level variables (b2)
Population of zip code (1990) 0.006 0.004
Avg Income of zip code (1990) 0.014* 0.006
Count of chain hotels -0.001 0.052
Count of Patel-owned hotels -0.107 0.127
Count of incorporated non-chain hotels 0.250** 0.067
Interaction of chain count for chain 0.472** 0.082
Interaction of Patel count for Patels 0.181 0.354
Inclusive values Yes**
Log Likelihood -3033**
**: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05
